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The world is facing its greatest refugee crisis since the Second World War, with more people 
forcibly displaced than at any time since 19451 and a deepening xenophobic backlash taking hold 
in the United States, Australia, Britain, and Europe. While the numbers of displaced have 
steadily increased, opportunities for repatriation, resettlement, or local integration have 
progressively decreased, leaving an alarming number of people either forcibly encamped or 
pushed into a clandestine existence, at risk of arrest, imprisonment, and deportation. 
 Most attention to the plight of refugees – including failures to protect or to provide for 
their human rights – has centered on how states should satisfy their international legal 
obligations, and on how international institutions should augment compliance with legal rules.2 
Our claim, however, is that these developments necessitate a focus on how forced migration also 
stimulates voluntary forms of political interaction between refugees and non-refugees, and that 
doing so serves as a vital corrective to the problematic depoliticization of the legalist approach. It 
is noteworthy, for instance, that the question “what is political solidarity?” is rarely asked in the 
international legal context of the refugee debates. This chapter, by contrast, seeks to illuminate 
the political practices ordinary people may take by acting neither for nor against but rather with 
refugees, through the work of Hannah Arendt. Arendt famously articulated a relational and 
interaction-oriented approach to political recognition with her notion of a “right to have rights.” 
We argue that Arendt’s notion can counter the formal legalism dominating this topic, when 
supplemented by the underutilized yet fruitful theme of solidarity in Arendt’s work. Taking our 
cue from Arendt’s contention that political equality and solidarity are co-requisites for reciprocal 
recognition of the subjects of rights, we then examine representative examples of solidaristic 
interaction that aim to counteract the “rightlessness” of refugees today, and consider how such 
collective action promotes shared freedom as inclusive world-making practices. 
 
                                                          
1 “Figures at a Glance,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed 3 August 2017, 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html. 
2 The recently adopted UNGA New York Declaration (19 September 2016), for example, calls on states to enhance 
the international community’s capacity to respond to mass displacement, through implementation of a 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). The CRRF is premised, however, on reaffirmation of the 
existing (and unmodified) international refugee regime. In this regard the New York Declaration reinforces the 
authoritative status of what Ian Hurd calls “international legalism”; How to Do Things with International Law 





Arendt, Refugees, and International Law 
Arendt’s now famous notion of a “right to have rights” arises from her analysis of the conclusion 
to the First World War. The Peace and Minority Treaties, the purpose of which were not only to 
bring the war to an end but also to create the conditions for peaceful co-existence in Europe, 
turned out in practice to have the opposite effect. The effort to create ethnically homogeneous 
nation-states from the dissolution of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires, 
resulted in massive population displacements when millions were ejected from their homes 
because of their ethnic or religious incompatibility with the new state. In theory mechanisms 
existed to deal with individuals who had lost the protection of their country of origin – asylum, 
repatriation, and naturalization – but these proved impotent in practice as states asserted that they 
were powerless to solve the problem in the face of the numbers of displaced.3 Repeated 
exhortations of societies for the protection of human rights went unheeded as these “well-
meaning idealists” failed to understand that protection of one’s rights abroad was based not upon 
being a natural rights-bearing individual but a citizen of a foreign friendly nation.4 The fact that 
states either would not or could not protect the rights of those who had lost nationally-guaranteed 
rights revealed a paradox at the heart of the system of rights upon which the modern state was 
supposed to be founded; and refugees became the living, breathing embodiment of this paradox.  
 Arendt locates the origin of this paradox in the French Revolution’s “Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen.” Until the upheaval of the revolution, rights and privileges had 
been derived from one’s position in society and had been guaranteed by social, spiritual and 
religious forces, rather than by government and constitution.5 The revolution turned this system 
on its head, and the rights of man were proclaimed as the foundation of all law, with man himself 
(not one’s station, nor God, or the customs of history) as their source. That man appeared as the 
sovereign in matters of law at the same time as “the people was proclaimed sovereign in matters 
of government,”6 holds the key to understanding how refugees could lose all human rights as 
soon as they lost nationally-guaranteed rights: “the ‘inalienable’ rights of man would find their 
guarantee and became an inalienable part of the right of the people to sovereign self-
government.”7 The whole question of human rights, therefore, was blended in modernity with 
the question of national emancipation. As Tal Correm’s chapter in this volume shows, the state’s 
identification with the nation inscribed an exclusionary logic into the heart of the modern 
principle that the rule of law will protect the rights of all persons equally.8 As long as people 
were recognized as belonging to a state, this merging of human rights and national emancipation 
was relatively unproblematic. However, with the rise of nationalism, the precarious balance 
established by the French Revolution between “nation” and “state” tipped decidedly in favor of 
the nation.9 The state gradually lost its representative function and became an instrument of the 
nation, transforming the “citizen” into the “national”. With the conquering of the state by the 
nation it became ever more obvious that not all people in Europe did belong to a nation-state, 
despite their physical presence within one state or another, and the millions forced to wander the 
                                                          
3 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1973), 270-75. 
4 Nanda Oudejans, “The Right to Have Rights as the Right to Asylum,” Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 
43, no. 1 (2014): 10. 
5 Arendt, Origins, 291. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Tal Correm, “Arendt on National Liberation and Federalism”, manuscript pages 2-4. 
9 Ayten Gündoğdu, Rightlessness in an Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles of Migrants 





European continent became the apotheosis of the reality that “the moment human beings lacked 
their own government and had to fall back upon [their supposedly inalienable human rights], no 
authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them.”10 The 
peculiar situation in which these refugees found themselves was one of “rightlessness,” rooted in 
the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever.11 In losing a 
“distinct place in the world,”12 the displaced lost not merely the rights to liberty, expression, or a 
fair trial but, even more, an acknowledged place in any organized community whatsoever; they 
lost, in Arendt’s parlance, the “right to have rights”.13 
 Arendt alerts us therefore to the fact that the paradox of modern human rights is twofold: 
it revolves, on the one hand, around inherent natural rights versus relational political entitlements 
and, on the other, around inclusive citizenship versus exclusive nationality. Whereas the 
sovereign power of the nation-state was seen increasingly as resting on the prior inalienable 
rights of man, universal human rights found their functional expression only in membership in a 
particular national state. The problem is that each human is thought to securely possess rights by 
virtue of his or her citizenship, yet the national state is the only entity authorized to confer 
citizenship and is only responsible for protecting the rights of its own citizens. The practical 
consequence of this twofold paradox is that the human being denied or deprived of citizenship 
turns out to have no rights at all, especially as the legal category of citizenship is frequently 
conflated with naturalized “tribal” categories of homogeneous nationality, ethnicity, culture, and 
race.14 Moreover, now that the entire planet is covered by nation-states, the paradox of human 
rights has been cemented into the international system. 
 The international legal landscape of human rights and forced migration has evolved 
significantly, of course, since Arendt first diagnosed the flaws of human rights and conceived of 
the right to have rights.15 Most notably, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
converted into legally binding treaties in 1966 and, further reinforcing the human rights 
framework, a complementary body of international refugee law progressively developed at the 
same time. In 1951, the same year as the publication of Origins, the UN adopted a new Refugee 
Convention, which formally guarantees to refugees certain rights and protections, and prohibits 
the return of a refugee to a territory where her life or freedom would be in danger.16 Nonetheless, 
the legal advances in refugee protection have by no means ensured either that all refugees have 
effective access to their human rights or that we are any closer to “solving” the refugee 
“problem” today. Refugees are increasingly vulnerable to (forcible) repatriation regardless of 
whether this repatriation is safe and desired by the refugees themselves.17 A logic of burden-
shifting, rather than burden-sharing, dominates state reactions to refugees, particularly in the 
Global North. The Common European Asylum Policy, for example, functions on an underlying 
logic of deterring asylum seekers from reaching European territory and thus accessing the 
                                                          
10 Arendt, Origins, 292. 
11 Ibid., 296. 
12 Ibid., 293. 
13 Ibid., 296. 
14 Ibid., 226-34. 
15 Megan Bradley, “Rethinking Refugeehood: Statelessness, Repatriation, and Refugee Agency,” Review of 
International Studies 40, no. 1 (2014): 102. 
16 “Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,” United Nations, accessed 1 September 2017, 
http://www.unhcr.org/uk/3b66c2aa10. 
17 B. S. Chimni, “From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable Solutions to 





harmonised procedures.18 For those who do manage to make it to Europe, the burden of 
examining an asylum claim and providing protection is shifted onto the border states of the 
Union and, if at all possible, onto “safe third countries” beyond the EU.19 Beyond Europe, 
Australia has one of the harshest asylum regimes in the world, outsourcing the imprisonment of 
asylum seekers to neighbouring south-east Asian states, many of whom are signatories of the 
Refugee Convention, but whose treatment of asylum seekers and refugees fall well below even 
the most basic protection standards.20  
 It is tempting to interpret these problems as rooted in a lack of juridical enforcement. The 
Refugee Convention has no formal monitoring mechanisms, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees is, in many ways, an office limited by its organizational structure, 
leaving its operations at the mercy of powerful donors such as the USA and the EU. Many 
scholars influenced by Arendt’s reflections highlight the weak provisions in international law 
relating to asylum, and argue that the right to have rights should be understood as legal 
citizenship status.21 It is, in other words, enticing to think that the answer to the predicaments 
highlighted above is more, or better, law. However, we contend that this would be to miss what 
is arguably the most important aspect of Arendt’s diagnosis of the refugee problem and the 
human rights paradox: that rights, and belonging to a common world, must be reciprocally 
affirmed as a matter of political practice – namely, the action of (re)establishing ties to a shared 
human world – and not merely of legal codification. There is no doubt that Arendt supported the 
protective juridical status of citizenship. However, the question is whether the principle of 
belonging to a political community is best expressed in the legalist language of citizenship rights. 
As we discuss below, in Arendt’s formulation the type of political community upon which 
human rights depend is not the nation-state per se but, more fundamentally, a common world that 
individuals share with others. 
 
The Right to Have Rights, Mutual Recognition, and Solidarity 
The persistence of mass forced displacement generates powerful calls for justice in terms of 
respecting and protecting the human rights of refugees. According to Arendt, however, we miss a 
great deal by looking at rights only through a juridical lens, and we may lose sight of the very 
phenomenon that gives rise to calls for justice – namely, solidarity as the intersubjective 
experience of human togetherness, especially as the distinctive experience of struggling to 
achieve political belonging between equals. More specifically, an inordinately juridical approach 
to refugee rights can succumb to what Shklar describes as “legalism,” and easily eclipse the 
political dimensions of claiming and enacting rights with others. According to Shklar, legalism is 
“the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral 
relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.”22 Legalism is a feature of 
contemporary international law, representing a (typically liberal) commitment to formal legal 
                                                          
18 Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz, “Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the Externalization of 
Asylum by Australia and Europe,” Government and Opposition 43, no. 2 (2008): 249.  
19 Ibid.  
20 In August 2016, The Guardian received a cache of over 2,000 leaked documents, now known as the Nauru Files, 
detailing appalling living conditions in the detention camps and allegations of widespread abuse, including of 
children, by authorities.  
21 See, for example: Alison Kesby, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 






principles and the legitimacy of judicial institutions and processes as the primary mechanisms by 
which to constrain state behaviour and protect individual rights. Yet, as Shklar notes, legalism 
fences “legal thinking off from all contact with the rest of historical thought and experience,” 
thereby obscuring “both the political provenance and the [political] impact of judicial 
decisions.”23 Seen in a purely legalist light, international human rights law can be said to enjoy 
great (though not undisputed) legitimacy, but that very same legalism contributes to 
depoliticizing our understanding of rights-claiming as an expression of the human capacity for 
solidaristic action.  
 Arendt expresses similar dismay at the eclipse of political experience in her critique of 
the well-intentioned focus on abstract rules and formal duties in the modern international human 
rights system. Even as the movement to formally codify human rights within international law 
rapidly gathered momentum in parallel to creation of the UN system, the prevailing 
understanding of human rights remained beholden to the tragic contradictions of the human 
rights paradox discussed above. When framed this way, not only do human rights have a 
nebulous theoretical origin in some higher “nature,” in practice human rights legalism proves to 
be largely impractical in the face of actual denials of rights.24 Shorn of a properly political basis 
for rights claims, refugees forced outside the bounds of law are routinely relegated to the margins 
of society. Hence, Arendt’s caution against trusting in human rights legalism as a reliable 
guarantee for the provision of refugees’ rights, coupled with her alternative proposal for a 
political rendering of the right to have rights, remains valid today. Expressed simultaneously as 
“the right of every individual to belong to humanity” and as “a right to belong to some kind of 
organized community,”25 the right to have rights is Arendt’s vindication of the claim to be 
recognised by others as a free and equal person in a political community understood as the 
“human artifice” of a common world. The world, for Arendt, is an associative public space that 
stands “in-between” human beings; it is composed of symbolically structured artifacts, 
institutions and relationships, and it provides a common ground for us to appear and respond to 
one another through our interactions.26 The world is both a condition for, and the creative 
realization of, human freedom expressed as political speech and action. Yet political action in 
and for the world depends not only upon the capacity to act as such, but to act as equals, that is, 
to act with others and neither for nor against them in a web of relationships.27 The right to have 
rights represents, then, the political condition of having a stable connection to a common world, 
which serves as the intermediary through which a plurality of human beings relate to each other 
and become capable of regarding one another as equals, of articulating reciprocal rights claims, 
and of respecting each other’s rights. This means that the practical enjoyment of human rights 
ultimately depends upon the artificial political status made manifest through mutual recognition 
in the name of freedom and equality. “Our political life,” Arendt explains, “rests on the 
assumption that we can produce equality through organization, because man can act in and 
change and build a common world, together with his equals and only with his equals.”28 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 3, ix.  
24 Arendt, Origins, 379 ff. 
25 Ibid., 298, 297. 
26 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 7-9, 49-57. 
27 Ibid., 180, 199-203. 
28 Arendt, Origins, 301. For some major interpretations of Arendt’s notion of the right to have rights, see Seyla 
Benhabib, “‘The Right to Have Rights’: Hannah Arendt on the Contradictions of the Nation-State,” in The Rights of 
Others, 49; James Ingram, “What Is a ‘Right to Have Rights’? Three Images of the Politics of Human Rights,” 





 When read against the relational process of seeking and extending recognition, we claim, 
Arendt’s appeal to the right to have rights thus acquires clearer political significance. A state 
may legislate laws that codify and provide for rights vertically, of course, but the enjoyment of 
rights will be practically efficacious and politically meaningful only when the freely associated 
members of a political community mutually recognize these rights among themselves as artifacts 
of political practice. Individuals mutually empower each other as rights bearers as an on-going 
act of horizontal political inclusion, whereby they regard each other as having the status of free 
and equal persons within the political community. Inclusion and politically effective equal rights 
thus stem from acts of plural subjects joining together to establish symmetrical relations of 
mutual recognition in shared political space, rather than being grounded on some innate and 
immutable natural feature.29 Insofar as an individual is recognised by others as having a claim to 
belong as an equal member of a political community, then he or she is recognised not just as a 
human being but as a person, a distinct and unique “who,”30 free to act and communicate with 
others in a political sphere.31 Recognition of a person as a politically-relevant actor in turn brings 
further access to and enjoyment of a variable bundle of rights mutually agreed upon and 
guaranteed by the members of a community, politically (de facto) even if not legally (de jure). 
 While many commentators understand the condition of belonging to a political 
community required by the right to have rights as equivalent to citizenship or the right to 
nationality,32 we believe such an interpretation is too narrowly conceived, for several reasons. 
First, “community” for Arendt can mean something other than the entity of nation-state (e.g. 
activist groups, salons, councils, town halls, communes, neighborhood assemblies, cities, and 
even globally federated polities). Second, “belonging” can mean something other and more than 
possessing the legal status of citizenship. In the deepest political terms endorsed by Arendt, 
“citizens” are simply those who “leave the privacy of their households” to exercise political 
freedom with others in the public political space “common to all.”33 Third, privileging 
citizenship as the referent for rights claims presupposes both a legal subject already located 
within defined national boundaries, and a coherent correspondence between that subject and a 
specific state expected to function as judicial safeguard of the rights promised to citizens. Such 
protections are routinely denied to refugees, whose national-legal links to any given state remain 
precariously incomplete in practice. Fourth, the citizenship interpretation problematically 
assumes that individuals are already constituted as legal subjects prior to their entry into the 
public realm of political interaction.34 Yet a person’s place in a common world is not solely the 
direct result of being (pre)defined as citizen, but more importantly is formed by way of socio-
political interactions with others to which shared meanings and reciprocal acknowledgements of 
                                                          
Constellations 3, no. 2 (1996): 200; and Serena Parekh, “A Meaningful Place in the World: Hannah Arendt on the 
Nature of Human Rights,” Journal of Human Rights 3, no. 1 (2004): 41. 
29 Michelman, “Parsing ‘A Right to Have Rights’,” 206. 
30 Arendt, The Human Condition, 175-76. 
31 Christoph Menke, “The ‘Aporias of Human Rights’ and the ‘One Human Right’: Regarding the Coherence of 
Hannah Arendt’s Argument,” Social Research 74, no. 3 (2007): 753. 
32 Kristy A. Belton, “Statelessness: A Matter of Human Rights,” in The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery 
Concept, ed. Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Margaret Walton-Roberts (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2015), 36. 
33 Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 132, 167 
34 Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for instance, declares: “Every citizen shall 
have the right and the opportunity . . . [to] take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives” (emphasis added). The Convention thus excludes a political rendering of the right to have rights, 





equal status are attached. It is not simply the loss of citizenship that matters for refugees; rather, 
the loss of a place in a world endowed with collective meaning and valued coexistence acquires 
greater existential weight in Arendt’s political conception of the right to have rights. The 
citizenship interpretation is unable to make sense of the predicament of those who, uprooted and 
compelled to surrender the freedom of participating directly in the voluntary ties of political life, 
struggle with the sense that “the recovering of a new personality is as difficult – and as hopeless 
– as a new creation of the world.”35 
 Although the legal category of citizenship certainly is a meaningful and functionally 
significant marker of “belonging” as an equal member of the modern state, in and of itself it is 
simply too reductive to capture the more expansive participatory meanings that Arendt otherwise 
foregrounds in her work. Our aim is not to dismiss the importance of legal affirmation of 
citizenship rights. The legal institutionalization of rights claims can bolster the protective mantle 
of citizenship status, of course, yet by themselves legal rights can mask the ability of non-
citizens to form interactional relationships with others as political agents and use reciprocally-
empowering human rights claims. Accordingly, the legalist paradigm remains incomplete unless 
complemented by participatory political solidarity.36 
 The way that mutual recognition operates as a mode of political action speaks not only to 
the capacity for freedom rooted in plurality, but more pointedly to the way in which that freedom 
is directed towards the affirmation of a worldly public space which is both constituted by our 
relationships with other selves and humanized by making that space more inclusive and equal. 
For Arendt, it is only when I am in the company of others who recognize me as their equal – as 
someone entitled to appear in the world with others – that I can be said to exist in an 
“equalizing” political relationship intermediated by a common world.37 This interpretation finds 
support in Arendt’s discussion of humanitas, in which she clarifies that the “worldliness” of the 
public realm is built on recognition of and encounters with diverse others. She suggests the world 
becomes increasingly humanized the more that we exhibit a cooperative disposition to share the 
world with other human beings to whom we stand in relation as unique yet equal. In the process 
of speaking and acting together with those different than us, of hearing and acknowledging other 
points of view, we infuse the world with an ethos of reciprocity, mutual respect, and 
understanding necessary for “humanness” to appear in a public space of equality and distinction 
between people.38 This ability to expand the scope of recognition enacts humanitas as a creative 
practice, and (re)constitutes the relational fabric of the common world. It also stands in stark 
contrast to the increasingly restrictive asylum policies of states, which seek to contain the 
freedom of movement of asylum seekers by limiting border access and removing refugees to 
isolated and precarious camps. Where this so-called “humanitarianism” is premised on 
distancing refugees from a world in which they may share political agency with non-refugees,39 
Arendt suggests the disposition of humanitas is characterized by the collective assertion of each 
                                                          
35 Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 271. 
36 Our interpretation of the right to have rights contra the legalist paradigm is, we believe, consistent with Arendt’s 
insistence that “it is precisely sovereignty [we] must renounce” if we wish to be free; Between Past and Future 
(New York: Penguin Classics, 2006), 165. This is because the legalist paradigm regards human rights as both 
founded alongside, and necessarily referring back to, the sovereign right of the state. For more on Arendt’s critique 
of the conventional alignment of political freedom with sovereignty, see the chapters by Keith Breen and Kei Hiruta 
in this volume. 
37 Arendt, The Human Condition, 215. 
38 Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace, 1968), 73-80. 





person’s right to belong to, act in, and jointly shape the world with others.40  In short, the 
capacity for freedom finds its most politically meaningful expression when it is experienced in 
acts of solidarity, conceived by Arendt as a world-oriented phenomenon of cultivating 
participatory human togetherness. 
 The discourse of solidarity has a long and diverse history.41 Solidarity may refer to an 
attitude, sentiment or feeling of connection and unity with others; more specifically, it is a “type 
of action” underpinned by a collective commitment to “standing together” either to promote 
some common political aim or to overcome some shared hardship, threat, or injustice.42 For our 
purposes the most pertinent question is, why does it matter how solidarity is conceived? The 
broad answer is that, given Arendt’s account of participatory freedom as coeval with the 
conditions of plurality and equality in the public realm, solidarity must be viewed as integral to 
political action itself. In Arendt’s eyes, “solidarity is a principle that can inspire and guide 
action.”43 She emphasizes, moreover, how solidarity specifically inspires individuals to 
“establish deliberately” a “community of interest with the oppressed and exploited,” yet this is 
done “dispassionately” insofar as solidarity looks upon “the strong and the weak, with an equal 
eye.”44 Although Arendt never systematically spelled out what she meant by solidarity, various 
aspects emerge in her writings that convey the distinctively political character of solidary action. 
A first dimension is revealed by the contrast Arendt draws between “brotherhood” and 
“solidarity.”45 Whereas the former concept connotes an intimate bond based on pre-existing 
familial, personal or “blood” ties, solidarity means freely forging relations of mutual recognition, 
respect, and obligation between unfamiliar persons. Philosophically, Arendt’s distinction can be 
described in terms of the differentiation made by Scholz between political and social solidarity. 
Social solidarity is predicated either on a pre-political group essence, such as race or nation, or 
on an identical “life” experience, such as systemic economic exploitation, which excludes those 
who do not share such paradigmatic characteristics.46 Political solidarity, to the contrary, is a 
type of constructed group relationship forged out of shared political commitments and acts of 
mutual support on behalf of differently situated individuals.47 Whereas social solidarity is 
exclusive, since it is “restricted to those who suffer in the same objective fashion,” political 
solidarity is inclusive, insofar as it “comprehends those who suffer and those who make common 
cause with them.”48 Solidarity, on this political view, is a participatory practice that ties plural 
individuals together “through collective political action” itself, instead of presuming that some 
unifying sameness first exists as the prerequisite for action.49 
 A second aspect of Arendt’s meaning of solidarity is the difference between negative and 
positive modes of solidarity. Negative solidarity refers to a sense of being united only by a 
                                                          
40 Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 12-17. 
41 See Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2005), and Lawrence Wilde, Global Solidarity (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
42 Avery H. Kolers, “Dynamics of Solidarity,” Journal of Political Philosophy 20, no. 4 (2012): 367. 
43 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006), 89. 
44 Ibid., 88-89. 
45 Ibid., 248; see also Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), 69. 
46 Ken Reshaur refers to this social conception of solidarity (or fraternity) as “natural solidarity”; see “Concepts of 
Solidarity in the Political Theory of Hannah Arendt,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 25, no. 4 (1992): 734. 
47 Sally J. Scholz, Political Solidarity (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008), 21-50; 
Arendt, Men in Dark Times, 13. 
48 Reshaur, “Concepts of Solidarity,” 725. 
49 Amy Allen, “Solidarity after Identity Politics: Hannah Arendt and the Power of Feminist Theory,” Philosophy & 





common experience of suffering, injustice, or oppression. While discovering that others are 
similarly affected by an “intolerable situation”50 may indeed draw an individual out of an 
egoistic focus on self, negative solidarity for Arendt nonetheless is deficient because it neither 
requires nor necessarily motivates taking further action. Because negative solidarity engenders a 
sense of commonality only from finding oneself subjected to the same fate as others, it serves to 
bind self and other not through acts undertaken in the pursuit of a common good but through 
fearful identification with a common bad.51 In comparison, positive solidarity arises when 
individuals together put their efforts either towards actively resisting oppression and injustice, or 
towards speaking and acting in the common cause of (re)building the relational fabric of a shared 
world. Positive solidarity is something achieved, by empowering individuals as actors capable of 
exercising their rights and responsibilities not just in their countries of legal citizenship, but in 
any political community in which they reside. Through speaking and acting together for the 
purpose of improving their common condition, those enacting positive solidarity sustain an 
accompanying sense of responsibility for a human plurality that thrives only in the inclusive 
space that lies between unique yet equal people. Arendt argues therefore that solidarity can be 
made “meaningful in a positive sense only if it is coupled with political responsibility.”52 
Political responsibility, for Arendt, is based on the recognition that our own freedom and equality 
is bound up with the freedom and equality of others, and thus that the public realm serves as the 
bridge between the individual and the collective. Solidarity entails an assumption of 
responsibility to assure others’ right to have rights – a responsiveness to the speaking and acting 
of others that respects their predicaments and perspectives – which also leads to establishing 
relationships that have the potential to deepen and sustain a common world. 
 A third key aspect of solidarity that emerges is “a readiness to share the world” with 
others.53 Solidarity in this sense is about political or civic friendship. Civic friendship, in contrast 
to personal friendship, is a kind of political togetherness in which we relate ourselves to others 
via the intermediary of a worldly in-between, thereby assuming a critical distance from the 
fusing affection of love in order to preserve our plurality and distinctiveness. Through 
respectfully supportive relationships of civic friendship “without intimacy,”54 we not only 
acknowledge the opinions and actions of others as meaningful but also question, debate, and 
challenge those opinions and actions through “incessant and continual discourse.”55 This form of 
civic friendship involves a sense of solidarity as being-with-others for the purpose of publicly 
seeking to (re)establish a shared world inhabited by a plurality of human beings. It also indicates 
that sharing the world with others and action are co-constitutive, since action is impossible in 
isolation from others: “a We is always engaged in changing our common world.”56 A final aspect 
of solidarity that follows from the practice of civic friendship is that “a readiness to share the 
world with others” is ultimately about hospitality. Hospitality, Arendt explains, is an “openness 
to others” which also serves to humanize the world by countering inequalities and exclusions 
structured into a society’s socio-legal institutions.57 This is because welcoming and encountering 
diverse others fosters a robust attitude of responsibility to the revelatory character of plurality 
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that enriches our sense of reality. In other words, the opinions of others need to be heard and 
their appearance needs to be seen, both to encourage our ability to think from the standpoint of 
others and to prevent our perception of reality from shrinking to the solipsistic perspective of a 
singular, internal consciousness. Arendt suggests that solidarity reinforces “the solid ground of 
reality” by remaining faithful to the “infinite plurality” of human beings and their “most 
elementary” freedom to be included in? some place on earth.58 Fundamental to solidarity is the 
act of welcoming others in such a way that acknowledges their equal political standing no matter 
where they may be from on earth. At the same time, freedom of movement – whether within or 
across state borders – is “the substance and meaning of all things political,” because the public 
space of politics can be neither forged nor sustained without the ability to freely encounter and 
“interact in speech with many others and experience the diversity of the world.”59 
 
Refugee Solidarity and World-Building from the Margins 
Arendt’s understanding of solidarity thus refers to individuals establishing inclusive relationships 
with others, so that each person can participate as a political equal in building the kind of world 
that they want to share. Central to this understanding is that solidarity is constituted by and with 
people of fundamentally diverse views and experiences, thereby making solidaristic belonging a 
political rather than pre-political phenomenon. The decisive contrast with legalism is that those 
engaged in solidaristic action do not simply view themselves “vertically” as mere subjects of the 
law and of a state’s citizenship, but instead regard each other “horizontally” as responsible co-
creators of the worldly space within which political participation, including the claiming and 
enacting of rights, can unfold. Arendt’s conception of solidarity shows us that it is from neither 
law nor charity alone that we can expect a “solution” to the refugee “problems” that occupy our 
attention today. The “durability” of any achievements in this area will always be relative to the 
different kinds of joint endeavours and relational attachments that link disparate peoples in terms 
of their concern for a shared, and thus human, world.  
 There are many instances of refugee solidarity around the world, where people from 
different backgrounds join together not only to resist the injustice of violent refugee exclusion, 
but even more powerfully to create modes of political inclusion that enable refugees to claim a 
meaningful place within local communities. It is the interactional nature of this refugee practice 
– where refugees have mobilized on their own as well as with allied non-refugee groups – that is 
of interest here. Through the following illustrative examples, we highlight some of the ways that 
different grassroots groups embody political freedom by speaking and acting together, generating 
the right to have rights as a gesture of solidaristic recognition across diverse identities and 
experiences, thereby empowering both refugees and non-refugees as equal political participants 
in building a common, hospitable world. 
 Over 1.3 million people sought asylum in the European Union (EU) in 2015, more than 
twice the number for all of 2014.60 The so-called “refugee crisis” prompted the EU to adopt a 
“new European Agenda on Migration”, which further entrenches the EU’s securitized “border 
management” approach to containing the “flow of irregular migrants” into Europe.61 Several EU 
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member states have adopted even more restrictive anti-migrant legislation, with Hungary perhaps 
the most extreme case. Since 2015, the nationalist government of Viktor Orbán has built a razor 
fence along Hungary’s southern border to keep out refugees; made it a criminal offence to enter 
the country through the border fence; authorized police to ban people entering, leaving and 
operating public areas and buildings; rejected the EU’s binding refugee redistribution quota 
system; and approved the mandatory detention of all asylum seekers in container camps.62 
Although these measures violate Hungary’s obligations under EU and international human rights 
law, Orbán chauvinistically asserts they are needed to “preserve” the purity of both a “Europe for 
the Europeans” and “a Hungarian Hungary.”63 
 These attempts by the Hungarian state to “immobilize mobility” and “depluralize” public 
space have sparked a number of grassroots activist movements seeking to challenge the material 
effects of the law by politicizing and “remobilizing” refugee agency.64 Volunteer groups such as 
SEM (Segítsünk Együtt a Menekülteknek/Let’s Help Refugees Together), W2Hu (Üdvözlünk 
Magyarországon/Welcome to Hungary), and Migszol (Migrant Solidarity Group of Hungary) 
seek to join citizens, NGOs, activist networks, and refugees together into political coalitions or 
“horizontal solidarities” meant to disrupt “the state’s immobilizing strategies” and jointly 
empower citizen and refugee political agency.65 
 Migszol furnishes a clear example of a voluntary political association playing a role in 
realizing the right to have rights, in the context of defying Hungarian (anti)asylum legislation 
intended to reinforce an ethnochauvinist citizen/non-citizen dichotomy. Launched in 2012, 
Migszol initially was a response to the reintroduction of asylum seeker detention but 
subsequently expanded its activities to address numerous exclusionary dimensions of the 
experiences of those seeking asylum in, or transiting through Hungary – including lack of 
adequate housing, healthcare, educational opportunities, and the prevalence of sexual violence 
against migrant and refugee women.66 Migszol’s goals centre on the principle of “speaking 
together with refugees and asylum seekers, not for them.”67 The group presents this principle as a 
mechanism for welcoming refugees, confirming their presence in the public realm, and involving 
them as equal participants with Hungarian citizens in joint political action. The principle is 
fundamentally inclusive and empowering, basing all decisions for collective action on agreement 
reached through open dialogue between the group’s plural members. Politically, the group is 
based on bringing equality into being, advocating a “non-hierarchical” bottom-up process to 
define its mode of organization, thereby making mutual recognition incumbent on each member, 
citizen and non-citizen alike.68 By strongly emphasizing each person’s mutually-guaranteed 
equal status within an “open” rather than closed political association, Migszol not only asserts 
the right of refugees to participate on an equal footing in decision-making processes but also sets 
the stage for each individual’s equal claim to political activity. Migszol’s politics-centred 
approach includes courses in Hungarian language and society aimed to empower refugees to 
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participate in and enact their own demands for community inclusion by making their voices, 
experiences, and opinions heard and therefore meaningful.69 Importantly, while Migszol engages 
in collaborative “horizontal” solidarities with other Hungarian civil society groups working on 
intersecting issues (such as poverty, homelessness, and discrimination against Roma), its explicit 
objective is to remain independent of both government institutions and humanitarian aid 
groups.70 Migszol insists on this autonomy to defy both depoliticizing narratives depicting 
refugees as “humanitarian victims lacking agency” and “vertical” statist politics reducing refugee 
identities to arbitrary legal and “bureaucratic categories.”71 Migszol’s participatory practices 
instead foreground “the right to be present in the public sphere” and “freedom of movement” as 
conditions central to reclaiming and fostering refugees’ agency, and hence their properly 
political status. In short, practicing participatory freedom and forging worldly bridges between 
its equal yet distinct members provides a rallying point for Migszol’s efforts to rehumanize 
shared public spaces in opposition to the legalized enforcement of segregation by the Hungarian 
government. 
Various efforts also have been undertaken in Australia to pursue the political aim of 
making worldly public space more inclusive in practice. Australian refugee policy has long been 
marked by a relative openness toward formally resettled refugees accompanied by a marked 
hostility toward spontaneous arrival of asylum seekers. Since the mid-1990s various iterations of 
detention and off-shore processing policies have effectively turned asylum seeking into a crime, 
the punishment for which is indefinite detention, usually in an off-shore camp.72 The conditions 
in such camps have frequently been described as unfit for human habitation, and successive 
Australian governments have been criticised as systematically violating the human rights of 
asylum seekers.73 Each iteration of such policies has been met with protests on the part of 
Australian citizens, refugees and asylum seekers, leading to the growth of a diverse and diffuse 
“refugee rights” movement. Many groups include refugees and asylum seekers in their activities, 
but the refugee rights movement in Australia has at times struggled with issues of paternalism, 
and a tendency to speak and act for, rather than with refugees, inadvertently playing into the 
portrayal of refugees as humanitarian victims lacking agency.74   
 Established in 2009, RISE: Refugees, Survivors and Ex-detainees is an organization run 
and governed by refugees, asylum seekers, and ex-detainees. Based in Melbourne, but working 
with refugees and other organizations nation-wide, RISE engages in political and legal advocacy, 
provides support services including assistance with housing and material needs, educational 
activities including English language tuition, and creative arts projects, all of which aim to 
redress social barriers, and to “empower refugee, ex-detainee and asylum seeker communities to 
actively participate in wider society.”75 RISE thus actively contests the exclusion of refugees and 
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asylum seekers not only from the everyday life of the communities in which they live but also 
from the formal political realm. In line with the motto of the organization, “Nothing about us 
without us,” RISE seeks to provide a forum for, and mechanism through which, refugees and 
asylum seekers can make their voices heard in local, state-level and national policy discussions 
on the issues that affect their status and everyday lives. In late November 2016, RISE began a 
campaign, #BlockTheBill, in opposition to proposed legislation that would result in lifetime bans 
from Australia for anyone who had attempted to reach Australia by boat since July 2013.76 In 
initiating the campaign, the refugees and asylum seekers of RISE stake a claim to a place in the 
public realm, assert their presence as an equitable right to belong, and actively counter their 
formal position in society as voiceless non-citizens. That RISE chose to make this intervention 
itself is significant. While keen to coordinate with other organizations involved in the refugee 
rights movement, RISE recognises the importance of refugees and asylum seekers being able to 
speak and act for themselves, rather than relying on the “translation” of their voices and 
experiences by other, albeit well-meaning, groups. In much the same way as Migszol in 
Hungary, RISE seeks to intervene in a hostile public environment toward refugees and asylum 
seekers through foregrounding equality-in-plurality, rather than sameness and the reproduction 
of hierarchical structures based on legal status. The experiences and opinions of all those 
involved in the group’s work are valued precisely because they are unique,77 and the ability of 
individuals to participate in the work of the organization is not dependent upon their legal status.     
 These examples suggest several observations about the contours of political solidarity 
from an Arendtian perspective. First, solidarity is an active rather than passive principle, 
something that is enacted through practices between plural groups rather than something 
inherently present within singular groups. Groups closed in on themselves, premising unity on 
sameness, will never be able to experience solidarity because they lack the experience of 
plurality and its attendant call for building multifaceted relationships with others. On this view, 
solidarity is plurality-dependent, as we cannot be in solidarity with “ourselves” (those “like us”) 
but only with other distinctively unique persons. Solidarity also has a process character, as 
something that must be brought into existence and sustained over time. The “becoming” of 
solidarity requires establishing spaces of appearance, confronting exclusions that prevent some 
individuals from appearing with others, and fostering collaborative practices that actualize the 
power potentials of the group. For these reasons, solidarity requires a continuing process of 
discussion, persuasion, and compromise to maintain an active balancing of respective positions. 
Such specificities are crucial to the dynamics of solidarity and to ensuring that the politicized 
spaces of joint action they build remain egalitarian and horizontally self-governing as established 
by participants. 
 Second, border securitization, including walling practices, constant surveillance, and 
compulsory detention, not only induce fear and insecurity in the everyday lives of refugees, but 
even more crucially restrict and debase their humanizing freedom of movement across time and 
space. The presumption of a sovereign entitlement to wield absolute control over borders diverts 
attention from the state’s exclusionary use of legal status to subjugate human beings, and to 
legitimize the widespread suppression of freedom as “normal.” Because shared worlds are built 
on relationships, interrupting movement and closing or tightening borders prevents individuals 
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from establishing and maintaining the worldly connections with others that sustain political 
freedom. Without channels through which we can move to meet other people “in the middle,” as 
it were, worlds cannot even begin to take shape much less be renewed. While political action 
often is temporary and transient, solidaristic action tends to cultivate practices sustained over 
longer periods of time, which deepen the relational bonds and trust involved in ongoing struggles 
for recognition in the public realm. Reclaiming freedom of movement is, then, integral to refugee 
solidarity networks which look to anchor world-building in a shared vision of collective 
responsibility for future collaboration. 
 Third, freedom of movement also entails a mental spatiality. On the one hand, it means 
the capacity to move corporeally in an uninhibited fashion, using borders not as barriers but as 
pathways through which people can connect via the qualitatively distinct spaces that can be 
bridged or brought together by relationships that conjoin such spaces into something shared or 
common. On the other hand, it means the ability to provoke the movement of thoughts, pushing 
our ideas, beliefs, and opinions forwards and backwards, in order to encounter other conceptual 
worldviews and, by way of constructing new mental connections based on imagining the world 
from other people’s points of view, thereby “enlarging” our thinking.78 The imaginative 
enlargement of our thinking plays a crucial part in solidarity as can be seen, for example, when 
we attend to Arendt’s famous depiction of the world as akin to a table which relates and 
separates those gathered around it.79 While the image of the table prompts us to consider the 
importance of plurality in that those seated around the table see it from different perspectives, the 
crux for solidarity is that it should also prompt us to reflect upon the vital political condition of 
equality; for without equality, how does anyone get invited to sit around the table, and discuss 
matters of common concern with others to begin with? As such, the process of enlarging our 
thinking engages critically with questions about how “tables” or worlds are created, who does or 
does not gain a seat at the table, and who is or is not seen and heard while sitting at the table. 
 Finally, however much solidarity groups may differ, they nonetheless all demonstrate that 
equality and freedom are co-constitutive of political action. As Arendt suggests, freedom 
becomes actualized through a relationship of equals, making equality a condition for the right to 
have rights. Yet the examples considered here demonstrate that equality is not assumed to be a 
“natural” quality by groups that view solidarity in fundamentally political terms; it is an 
“artificial” product of plural human beings working together to create the conditions in which 
they can regard one another as equals and thereby guarantee each other rights. Another way to 
put this is that participants in solidarity activism are capable of seeing each other as equals – 
before each other and not simply “before the law” – because they stand in relation to a common 
world arising through jointly acting in concert. In this sense, the right to have rights refers not 
only to a status but to an activity, of participating in the construction of a shared world in which 
different people can be “equalized.” It is based, in other words, on the presumption of having an 
equal share in a political community and the possibility of freely participating on equal terms 
with others. Belonging of this sort, which accentuates the inextricable connection between 
equality and freedom, is captured by Arendt’s appeal to Greek isonomia, which denotes “that all 
have the same claim to political activity.”80 
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Reflecting on the global challenge posed by the record number of human beings now forcibly 
displaced, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi recently suggested the 
“problem” must be seen in a new light: “The numbers are staggering. Each one represents a 
human life. But this is not a crisis of numbers. It is a crisis of solidarity.”81 With this in mind, 
Grandi proposed the need for “solutions” that enable refugees “to reclaim or acquire full 
membership in society and to build a stable future.” The argument of this chapter has been that 
refugee solidarity, when viewed through an Arendtian lens of mutual recognition and collective 
political interaction, provides one potent pathway for refugees to (re)claim their right to have 
rights and participate in building a shared world genuinely hospitable to their future as equal 
members of society. 
 Drawing on Arendt’s critique of human rights legalism, we have argued that solidaristic 
interactions cannot be encapsulated in narrowly juridical terms. Despite attempts to deny 
refugees and asylum seekers any effective political agency by relegating them to the margins of 
society, numerous voluntary associations have emerged seeking to carve out world-centric 
spaces in which solidaristic interactions can take place beyond the state- and citizenship-centric 
vantage point of legalism. Burgeoning refugee solidarity associations can be characterized, we 
suggest, as bolstering freedom in the guise of joint political action to empower the world-making 
capacity of refugees and asylum seekers. Without necessarily being informed directly by 
Arendt’s work, the refugee solidarity groups considered in this chapter exhibit an Arendtian 
understanding of constructing and sharing a common world based on mutual recognition of a 
politically-constituted equal human status. By standing up for themselves with others, refugees 
meaningfully assert their agentic capabilities and participate in translating their plight into 
political and not merely juridical terms. This shifts the focus of refugee politics from the state as 
legal protector of national membership to refugees as political actors in their own right, 
irrespective of citizenship status. Through this lens, a politically-sensitive understanding of the 
practice of solidarity can be glossed as a virtuous circle: since acting together with others 
depends upon human plurality, solidaristic action helps to strengthen the bonds of belonging so 
that everyone can feel at home in a common world. In the end, solidarity by and with refugees is 
a politically significant attempt to transform the widespread perception that human plurality is a 
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